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In this paper, the total payoff of each agent is regulated to reduce the heterogeneity of the distribution of the
total payoffs. It is found there is an optimal regulation strength where the fraction of cooperation is prominently
promoted, too weak or too strong of the strength will have little effects or result in the disappearance of the
cooperators. It is also found that most of the cooperators are not distributed in isolation but form the cooperator
clusters, and to promote the cooperation the only way is to enlarge the size of the cooperator clusters. Finally,
we try to explain the emergence of larger clusters and prove the existence of the optimal regulation strength.
Our works provide insight into the understanding of the relations between the distribution of payoffs and the
cooperative behaviors.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is a widespread and important phenomenon
in natural and social systems, which is the foundation for
the sustainable development of creatures. However, individ-
uals are instinctively self-interested, which will drive them
to cheat to obtain more benefits rather than to cooperate.
Therefore, understanding the conditions for the emergence
and promotion of cooperation is one of the fundamental and
central problems in biological, social, and economic science
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Cooperative phenomenon
can be well described by game theory. As one of the repre-
sentative games, prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) seizes the
characteristics of the conflict between the selfish individuals
and the collective interests. In PDG, when most of the indi-
viduals take the cooperation strategy, the collective interests is
optimized, but as to an individual, if it cheats when its oppo-
nents cooperate, it will profit much greater than it cooperates
and its opponents will profit little, even none. Thus, more and
more individuals will cheat, as a result the cooperation will
decrease. Ultimately, all the individuals will receive lower
payoffs than they take the cooperation strategy.
There are many mechanisms that can promote the cooper-
ation of PDG, such as repeated interaction [1], spatial exten-
sions [12], reciprocity [13], and partly randomly contacts [14].
Very recently, payoffs had also been found playing an crucial
role in promoting cooperation in PDG [15, 16, 17]. Partic-
ularly, Perc found that Gaussian-distributed payoff variations
is more successful in promoting cooperation than Levy dis-
tribution of payoffs [15], indicating heterogeneity of payoffs
will do harm to the cooperation amongst egoistic individuals.
Then a natural question has arisen: what is the effective way
to regulate the total payoff of each agent to optimize the co-
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operation? Here in this paper, we try to give an answer to this
question.
As we all know, taxation is of fundamental importance for
every country, it is not only a way to raise funds but also an
effective way to regulate the incomes of individuals to main-
tain the social stability. In this paper, based on the idea bor-
rowed from the tax policy, we regulate the total payoff of each
agent to decrease the broadness of the distribution of payoffs.
We will show that when the payoffs are regulated to some
extent, the fraction of cooperation will be greatly promoted,
however, if the regulation is too strong, the cooperation will
be suppressed again. We also try hard to give a convincing
explanation for the promotion of cooperation.
II. MODEL
In the spatial PDG, agents located on a square lattice fol-
low two simple strategies: cooperation (C) or defect (D), de-
scribed as the form of vector:
φ =
(
1
0
)
or
(
0
1
)
. (1)
When a cooperator meets a cooperator, both of them get re-
ward 1, and when a defector meets a defector, they each get
0. And when a cooperator meets a defector, it gets 0, but the
defector receive temptation b, 1 < b < 2. The above rule can
be expressed by a matrix:
ψ =
(
1 0
b 0
)
, (2)
which is called payoff matrix, and the parameter b charac-
terizes the temptation to defection against cooperation. Each
agent plays PDG with its four neighbors. Therefore, the total
payoff of the player i is the sum of payoffs after i interacts
2with its 4 neighbors, which is written as:
Pi =
∑
j∈Λi
φTi ψφj , (3)
where Λi denotes four neighbors of individual i. In classical
PDG, an agent updates its strategy according to the following
rule: the agent i plays PDG with its neighbors, then randomly
selects a neighbor j, and adopts its strategy with probability
Gi→j =
1
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/T ]
, (4)
where T characterizes the stochastic noise. For T = 0, the in-
dividual always adopts the best strategy determinately, while
irrational changes are allowed for T > 0. In numerical sim-
ulation, noise level is often set as T = 0.1 because a few
irrational behavior is common in real economic systems.
In our regulation scheme, we regulate the total payoffs:
Wi = P
α
i , (5)
where α > 0 is the regulation parameter. It is notable that
α = 0 is forbidden because it is meaningless for Pi. In the
case α = 1, the present model restores to classical PDG.
When α decreases from 1 to 0, the heterogeneity of the pay-
offs distribution is also depressed, and when α goes to 0, the
differences of total payoffs for different agents disappear. In
this paper, we replaced the total payoffs Pi and Pj in equation
(4) by the regulated payoffs Wi and Wj , and investigate how
the cooperation will be affected by this regulation.
III. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
n order to describe the evolution process of the game, we
employ the fraction of cooperations as an order parameter
ρC =
1
L2
L2∑
i=1
φTi
(
1
0
)
. (6)
Based on a periodic boundary lattice with size of 100 × 100,
an extensive Monte Carlo numerical simulation is performed
with random initial states. After the system reaches dynamic
equilibrium, ρC is calculated and the final results are obtained
after the averaging of 10000 times.
Figure 1 (a) shows the cooperation fraction ρC as a function
of b at different values of α. It displays that ρC decreases
monotonically with the increasing of b, no matter what α is.
Most interestingly, the cooperation are greatly affected by the
parameter α for fixed b: in a large region of α, ρC will be
increased, indicating the reduction of heterogeneity of payoffs
will improve the cooperation. It worth noting that there is at
least one optimal value of α where ρC takes its maximum,
larger or smaller α will cause the decreasing of ρC . Thus, to
quantify the effects of α on the promotion of cooperation for
different b, we present the dependence of ρC on α in Fig. 1
(b). Clearly, in the α region (0.37, 1.0), ρC is larger than the
case of classical PDG (α = 1.0), and at the point α = 0.5
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FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperation ρc as a function of b in (a) and α in
(b). b is fixed at 1.01 in (a).
ρC reaches its maximum, where the cooperation is promoted
prominently. But when α < 0.2 or α > 1.4, there will be no
cooperator, which means that both higher and lower value of α
will jeopardize cooperation. It is especially worth noting that
our regulation scheme is more powerful for larger temptation
b, for example, at b = 1.005, for the classical PDG (α =
1.0), the fraction of cooperation ρC = 0.3855 and for the
best case of our regulation scheme (α = 0.5), ρC = 0.5060,
the increment is ∆ρC = 0.1205; but for a larger temptation
b = 1.020, the fraction of cooperation ρC will increase from
0.0 to 0.3736, with the increment ∆ρC = 0.3736.
To explain why the cooperation are so prominent at α =
0.5, we give the snapshots of the distribution of cooperation
when α takes three typical values: 0.3, 0.5 and 1.0, which
are shown in Fig 2. Clearly, most of the cooperators are not
distributed in isolation but form some clusters. When the
payoffs are not regulated (α = 1.0) or regulated too much
(α = 0.3), there are only a few cooperator clusters in the
system, but when α = 0.5, there will emerge so many coop-
erator clusters that the cooperation are remarkably promoted.
We also count the number of cooperator clusters, which has
no notable changing for a large region of α, but the maxi-
mal and average size of the cooperator clusters will be greatly
increased in some region of α, which is shown in Fig 3(a)
and the inset. Moreover, the distribution of cooperator clus-
ters at the three values of α are also plotted in Fig 3(b). It
is clear, when α = 0.5, there are much more large clusters
(SC > 86) than when α is 0.3 or 1.0, and the small size clus-
ters (4 < SC < 80) are less than the two cases.
From the above simulation results we can assert, when α
increases from 0.0, there is no cooperator in the system until
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FIG. 2: For panels (a), (b), and (c), typical snapshots of the distri-
bution of cooperators (light gray) and defectors (black) on a square
100 × 100 lattice obtained for different value of α by b=1.01. (a)
α = 0.3, (b) α = 0.5, and (c) α = 1.0.
α reaches some threshold, then the cooperators emerge, with
α’s increasing, more and more agents becomes cooperators
and the cooperator clusters become larger and larger, when α
reaches 0.5, the number of cooperators, the maximal and aver-
age size of cooperator clusters all reach their maximums, and
further increase α, where the payoffs are not regulated much,
the cooperations are repressed again, more and more agents
prefer to cheat, the cooperation decrease again, till disappear.
It seems that the emergence of larger cooperator clusters cause
the promotion of cooperation since when the fraction of coop-
eration is promoted the number of cooperator clusters will not
change but the size of them will be greatly enlarged, as shown
in insets of Fig 3(a). Our assertion is consistent with the pre-
vious researches that cooperators survive by forming compact
clusters. And the cooperative agents along boundary resisting
against defectors can be enhanced by, for example, heteroge-
neous structure [18], attractiveness of the neighbors [19, 20],
and stochastic interactions [21].
Here we try to explain how the cooperator clusters are
formed and why the average cluster size reaches maximum
at α = 0.5. In our simulation, the initial state, cheat or coop-
erate, of each agent is assigned randomly, from the statistical
theory we know that at the very beginning there are already
some cooperator clusters, to enlarge the already exist clusters,
the defectors along the boundary of the cooperator clusters
should be more inclined to change their strategies to cooper-
ate, and the probability is decided by two aspects, one is the
number of cooperators of their 4 neighbors and the other is the
probability Gi→j = 1/{1 + exp[(Wi −Wj)/T ]}. Along the
boundary of the cooperator clusters, the defector must have
neighbors who are cooperators, so their total payoffs PD are
not less than b, and for the cooperators, they must have at least
one neighbor who is also cooperator, which makes their total
payoffs PC take values 1, 2 or 3 but 0, as a result, PD may
larger or smaller than PC . When PD > PC , with α’s de-
creasing from 1, PαD − PαC > 0 becomes smaller and smaller,
correspondingly,GD→C becomes larger and larger. But when
PD < PC , with α’s decreasing from 1, PαD−PαC < 0 becomes
larger and larger, correspondingly, GD→C becomes smaller
and smaller. As a consequence, when PD > PC , smaller
α is better for the formation of cooperator clusters but when
PD < PC , larger α is better, thus, there must be a right value
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Panel (a) shows size of the largest clusters
formed by cooperators varying with α, and the inset shows the num-
ber of clusters NC (upper) and average size of clusters formed by co-
operators S¯C (lower). Clearly, NC keeps about 150 from α = 0.37
to α = 0.85, while S¯C reaches its maximal value at α = 0.5. Panel
(b) displays distribution of cooperators’ cluster size for different val-
ues of α. b=1.01 in both panels (a) and (b).
of α, which is optimal for the formation of the cooperator
clusters, that is the reason why the fraction of cooperator is
optimized at α = 0.5 in our simulation.
From the above analysis we can also concluded that the
more cooperators of a defector’s neighbors are, the easier for
it to become a cooperator. The reverse situation can also be
proved that if most of the neighbors are defectors for a co-
operator, the easier for it to becomes a defector. By far, we
can give a picture of the evolution of the cooperator clusters:
there must be broad boundary where the defectors around are
changed to cooperators and acute boundary where the cooper-
ators become defectors, which can be seen in Fig. 4. A larger
cluster can be divided into some smaller clusters when it is
cut by defectors (Fig. 4, from (b) to (c)), that is the reason
why the clusters could not keep growing. Certainly, several
clusters can also form a large one (Fig. 4, from (c) to (d)). So
the clusters evolve endlessly in a system.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we regulate the total payoffs of each agent
to narrow down the differences between agents in the spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game, and find that there is an optimal
regulation strength where the cooperation is greatly promoted,
especially for larger temptation. Too strong of the regulation
will depress the cooperation, even cause the disappearance of
the cooperators. We reassure that it is the larger size not the
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FIG. 4: Four successive evolvements of the cooperator clusters.
From (b) to (c), a cluster is divided into two clusters and from (c)
to (d), two clusters form a larger new one. Here, the area of 10× 10
is the part of 100×100 in the system, and the light gray sites present
cooperative agents.
number of cooperator clusters that promote the cooperation.
We also prove the existence of the optimal regulation strength
and explain the formation of larger cooperator clusters. Our
results provide quantitative analysis of payoffs’ effects on co-
operation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Compared with
other factors of maintaining cooperation such as spatial exten-
sions, reciprocity, and punishment, reducing the heterogeneity
of payoffs is more realistic for it seizes individual fitness by
game payoffs. Regarding economic process, our findings sug-
gest that moderate tax policy can plays an important role in
maintaining cooperation among social individuals.
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